Private Property Rights and Pollution in Emerging Market Economies by Yang, Zhenzeng
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Private Property Rights and Pollution in
Emerging Market Economies
Zhenzeng Yang
Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
30. July 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48717/
MPRA Paper No. 48717, posted 18. September 2013 23:57 UTC
Private Property Rights and Pollution in Emerging
Market Economies
Zhenzeng Yang
Tianjin University of Finance and Economics. 25 Zhujiang Rd., Tianjin 300222, PRC
Abstract
I use cross-country panel data to show that strengthening of private property
rights protection lowers pollution emission intensity. The finding is robust
to the inclusion of many controls and use of different independent variables.
This paper provides preliminary empirical evidence for property rights theory
of environmental goods, and suggests that completely specifying property
rights is an important approach to response to environmental degradation.
Keywords: Private Property Rights, Pollution, Emerging Market, CO2
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1. Introduction
In economics literature, environmental pollution is usually explained by
market failure caused by externalities. For open-access resources, no one
can exclude others from using them, and in this circumstance, the private
marginal costs of exploiting these resources are lower than social marginal
costs, while private marginal earnings are higher than social marginal earn-
ings. This induces the situation as Aristotle described “that which is com-
mon to the greatest number has the least care bestowed on it”, which is called
tragedy of the commons by Hardin (1968).
There are typically two solutions offered for avoiding the tragedy, regu-
lating entry and use of environmental goods (by the government) and spec-
ifying property rights (privatize the commons). Regulation can base on ei-
ther command-and-control or market mechanisms, and the later encompasses
Pigou taxes and trading systems1. Supporters of specifying property rights
1Regulations are getting increasingly relying on property-rights-based market mecha-
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argue that environmental pollution and resource overexploit are consequences
of inadequate specification of property rights in environmental goods. Gov-
ernments usually mismanage publicly owned natural resources because public
resource managers do not bear all the costs of their management decisions
for the reason that they are not personally invested in the resources (Ander-
son and Leal, 1991), and they are short-sighted relative to private resource
owner. In contrast, private owners manage their resources more carefully to
maximize their interests, and they have lower discount rates and longer time
horizons than public resource managers, and thus lead to longer-term invest-
ments or conservation2. Completely specified property rights also allows one
to prevent unauthorized emissions from neighborhood by means of lawsuit.
Moreover, specifying property rights helps internalize externalities (Coase,
1960). So complete privatization might be the way to solve the tragedy.
Property rights theory on environmental goods implies that strengthening
of private property rights (PPR) protection may ease pollution or resource
overexploitation, but few research investigates this relationship empirically.
In this paper, I estimate the relationship using data of emerging market
economies, showing that strengthening of PPR protection lowers pollution
intensity in these economies, and the result is robust.
2. Data and Empirical Framework
Emerging markets3 are defined as nations with social or business activity
in the process of rapid growth and industrialization. Rapid industrialization
induces rapid growth of non-agriculture sectors, such as manufacturing and
service sectors. Pollution and resource overexploitation are receiving more
critiques in these countries simultaneously. Institutions, including private
property rights protection and the integrity of legal system, are improved at
the same time. They are candidates of high income countries but
may encounter bottlenecks of environmental degradation. That’s
why this paper focus on these emerging market economies.
nisms, such as European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and tradable SO2
emission quotas used in the United States.
2See Cole (2000) for more comprehensive discussion.
3There are 24 economies listed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, South
Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela.
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Pollution is the introduction of contaminants into the natural environ-
ment that cause adverse change. Overall pollution severity is hard to measure
accurately as pollution takes various forms, including chemical substances or
energy, and poses various forms of damage to human beings and the ecology.
WDI (World Development Indicators, World Bank Group) database provides
cross-country CO2 emissions and other greenhouse gas (HFC, PFC, SF6 and
others) emissions data as CO2 equivalent. Data on other greenhouse gas
only covers a few years discontinuously. But noting that generally these
forms of pollution yield at the same time in industrial production,
it is rational to use CO2 emission as a swap index of overall pol-
lution. Precisely, CO2 emissions per 2000 US$ of GDP is used as pollution
intensity index in the following empirical analysis. To further test the ro-
bustness of the empirical results, I also consider the effect of PPR protection
on water pollution.
Property right is a bundle of rights that are relevant for the use of re-
sources, including access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation.
These elements of rights can be separately assigned to different individuals
as well as being viewed as a cumulative scale moving from the minimal right
of access through possessing full ownership rights (Ostrom, 2000). Ideally,
property rights can be divided into four categories: private, common, state
and open access. Real-world property regimes inevitably combine features
from various ownership categories (see Feeny et al. 1996 and Cole 2000, for
example). Confusions rise up even for scholars of legal and economics. But
generally, definition and enforceability of private property rights both should
be considered when measuring the intensity of PPR protection. Area 2 Legal
System and Property Rights in EFW dataset4 is chosen as the index of PPR
protection in the following empirical analysis. There are nine sub-index in-
cluding judicial independence, impartial courts, protection of property rights,
military interference in rule of law and politics, integrity of the legal sys-
tem, legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the sale of real
property, reliability of police and business costs of crime, so it is a com-
prehensive indicator of private property rights protection covering
both the definition and enforceability of PPR.
4The Economic Freedom Dataset dataset is published in Economic Freedom of the
World: 2012 Annual Report, authored by James D. Gwartney, Joshua C. Hall, and Robert
Lawson, available at http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html.
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I use country-level panel data5 from WDI database and EFW dataset to
estimate the following equation to see the effect of private property rights
protection on pollution intensity:
log(CO2)it = β0 + β1 log(PPR)it + β2Xit + εit (1)
and
log(BOD)it = β0 + β1 log(PPR)it + β2Xit + εit (2)
where i and t denote the individual and time period, respectively. The mean-
ing and source of variables are as follows:
• Dependent Variable:
– log(CO2), log of CO2 emissions per 2000 US$ of GDP, indicating
pollution intensity, WDI;
– log(BOD), log of organic water pollutant (BOD) emissions mea-
sured in two dimensions: kg of BOD emissions per 2000 US$ of
GDP and kg of BOD emissions per day per worker6.
• Independent Variable: log(PPR), log of private property rights protec-
tion index, Area 2 Legal System and Property Rights in EFW dataset;
• Controlling Variables: Xit includes
– log(NAVA), log of value added by non-agricultural sectors as per-
centage of GDP, representing economic structure. WDI,
– log(IVA), log of value added by industrial sectors as percentage of
GDP, representing economic structure. WDI,
5Restricted by data availability, variables range from the year of 2000 to 2009, covering
24 emerging economies.
6Emissions of organic water pollutants are measured by biochemical oxygen demand,
which refers to the amount of oxygen that bacteria in water will consume in breaking down
waste. This is a standard water-treatment test for the presence of organic pollutants. The
data were updated by the World Bank’s Development Research Group using the same
methodology as the 1998 study by Hemamala Hettige, Muthukumara Mani, and David
Wheeler, “Industrial Pollution in Economic Development: Kuznets Revisited” (available
at www.worldbank.org/nipr).
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– log(Topen), log of trade openness index, the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domes-
tic product7, WDI;
– log(PPR)*log(Topen), the interactive term of PPR and trade open-
ness.
• εit is random error term.
3. Empirical Results
3.1. Effect of PPR protection on CO2 Emissions
I first estimated the effect of PPR protection on CO2 emissions. After F
test and Hausman test, random-effect panel data model is chosen. Regression
results are summarized in Table 1.
Column (I) reports basic estimation of Eq. (1) that using log(NAVA) as
control variable. There is a negative and statistically significant relationship
between the PPR protection index and CO2 emissions intensity, with an
estimated coefficient of -0.2132, that is, strengthening of private property
rights lowers pollution intensity.
To determine the robustness of this main effect, I then conducted five
robust estimation and the results are presented in Column (II) to (VI). The
specification used in Column (II) adds the trade openness index. The esti-
mated coefficient on the private property rights is -0.2095, slightly lower than
in Column (I). Trade openness has no significant impact on CO2 emission
intensity.
Pollution haven effect may induce pollution intensive industries to be
shifted to developing countries where environmental regulations are weak,
other by means of direct investment or outsourcing activities of firms from
high income countries. So Column (III) adds interactive term between PPR
protection and trade openness to test this effect. The estimated coefficient
of PPR protection is -0.3149 ( -0.3470 multiplied by means of log(Topen)
7Some studies find that environmental regulations in developed countries may push
pollution intensive industries to developing countries where environmental regulations are
weak, see Cole et al. (2010) and Dean et al. (2009) for example. This pollution haven
effect will induce firms in industrialized countries import more pollution intensive goods
from developing countries
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plus 1.1591), much larger than that in Column (I) and (II), showing a neg-
ative and statistically significant impact on CO2 emission intensity. Trade
openness becomes significant after the inclusion of interactive term, with an
estimated coefficient of 0.0345 (-0.3470 multiplied by mean of log(PPR) then
plus 0.5996). It provides some support for Pollution Haven Hypothesis, but
this finding is NOT robust (as showed in the following estimations).
Column (IV) to column (VI) use log(IVA) as control variable instead of
log(NAVA). PPR protection remains statistically significant and has a neg-
ative impact on CO2 emission intensity, while economic structure measured
by value added by industrial sectors is not significant. The estimated coeffi-
cient of PPR protection is also much larger when interactive term is included
(with the value of -0.4848, -0.4813 multiplied by means of log(Topen) then
plus 1.5597). Again, trade openness is not significant without inclusion of the
interactive term, it becomes significant after the inclusion of the term with
an estimated coefficient of -0.0171 (-0.4813 multiplied by mean of log(PPR)
then plus 0.7666).
Table 1: Effect of PPR protection on CO2 Emissions
Random Effect
log(CO2) I II III IV V VI
Intercept 14.8880*** 14.9098*** 11.6069*** 0.7183* 0.7199* -2.1978***
(1.6824) (1.6856) (1.8659) (0.4246) (0.4257) (0.7531)
log(PPR) -0.2132*** -0.2095*** 1.1591*** -0.3570*** -0.3578*** 1.5597***
(0.0513) (0.0516) (0.3720) (0.0567) (0.0572) (0.4189)
log(NAVA) -3.1542*** -3.2097*** -2.9500***
(0.3770) (0.3808) (0.3770)
log(IVA) 0.0482 0.0564 0.0193
(0.1143) (0.1371) 0.1315
log(Topen) 0.0524 0.5996*** -0.0068 0.7666***
(0.0452) (0.1539) (0.0617) (0.1778)
log(PPR)*log(Topen) -0.3470*** -0.4813***
(0.0935) (0.1042)
R-Squared 0.35 0.35 0.38 0.15 0.15 0.22
F-statistic 61.62 41.31 36.17 19.94 13.26 16.22
N of Obs. 237 237 237 237 237 237
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, and *** are 10, 5,and 1% significance levels.
In short, the estimation results show that PPR protection has a signifi-
cant negative impact on CO2 emission intensity, providing some preliminary
empirical evidence for property rights theory of environmental goods. Its
impact is larger when trade openness is considered in estimation. Economic
structure measured by weight of non-agricultural sectors has a significant
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negative impact on CO2 emission intensity, but that measured by industrial
sector has no significant impact. The impact of trade openness is uncertain.
3.2. Effect of PPR protection on BOD Emissions
To further check the robustness of the main finding, I conducted many
estimation on Eq. (2) using organic water pollutant (BOD hereinafter) emis-
sion intensity as dependent variable instead. Because of serious data missing,
it is not effective to conduct panel regression, so pooled estimation is chosen.
The empirical results are summarized in Table 2.
In Column (I) to (III), kilograms of BOD emissions per 2005 US$ of
GDP is used as BOD emission intensity index. PPR protection has signif-
icant negative impact on BOD emission intensity when trade openness and
the interactive term are included, with the estimated coefficients of -1.2720
(Column II) and -1.1971 (Column III, calculated as -1.8347 multiplied by
mean of log(Topen) then plus 6.5964) respectively. The results also provide
some support for Pollution Haven Hypothesis, with the estimated coefficients
of 0.6158 (Column II) and 0.8223 (Column III, calculated as -1.8347 multi-
plied by mean of log(PPR) then plus 3.81) respectively.
In Column (IV) to (VI), kilograms of BOD emissions per day per worker
is used as BOD emission intensity index. PPR protection also has significant
negative impact on BOD emission intensity. But impact of economic struc-
ture (measured by weight of non-agricultural sectors) is reversed. Another
notable result is that pollution haven effect disappeared here.
Table 2: Effect of PPR protection on BOD Emissions (Pooled Estimation)
Kg per 2005 US$ of GDP Kg per day per worker
log(BOD) I II III IV V VI
Intercept 19.8818*** 12.8009** -3.8290 -9.3335*** -7.8956*** -10.0526***
(6.1228) (5.5735) (6.6714) (1.5918) (1.5262) (1.9242)
log(PPR) -0.4986 -1.2720*** 6.5964*** -0.4263*** -0.2692*** 0.7514
(0.3321) (0.3244) (1.9772) (0.0863) (0.0888) (0.5703)
log(NAVA) -5.8274 -4.5770*** -3.9169*** 1.8279*** 1.5740*** 1.6596***
(1.4295) (1.2874) (1.2215) (0.3717) (0.3525) (0.3523)
log(Topen) 0.6158*** 3.8100*** -0.1251*** 0.2892
(0.1079) (0.7995) (0.0296) 0.2306
log(PPR)*log(Topen) -1.8347*** -0.2380*
(0.4555) (0.1314)
R-Squared 0.27 0.43 0.50 0.20 0.31 0.33
F-statistic 22.07 29.54 29.12 14.89 17.33 14.08
N of Obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, and *** are 10, 5,and 1% significance levels.
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In summary, the results show that for emerging market economies: (1)
CO2 and BOD emission intensity decrease as PPR protection is
strengthened. This result provides preliminary support for prop-
erty right theory on environmental goods; (2) Economic structure mea-
sured by value added by non-agricultural sector has significant negative im-
pact on CO2 emission intensity and BOD emission intensity measured in “per
constant $ of GDP” scale; (3) the results only provide very limited support
for pollution haven hypothesis.
4. Conclusion
Although private property rights play an important role in environmental
issues, but to my knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the rela-
tionship empirically using cross-country data. The empirical results show
that strengthening of private property protection lowers pollution intensity
in emerging market economies. This paper provides preliminary empirical
evidence for property rights theory of environmental goods, and suggests to
policy-makers that completely specifying property rights might be an impor-
tant approach to response to environmental degradation.
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